Abstract. Bike-sharing systems are becoming an urban mode of transportation. In such systems, users arrive at a station, take a bike and use it for a while, then return it to another station of their choice. Each station has a finite capacity: it cannot host more bikes than its capacity. A stochastic model is proposed to study the effect of users random choices on the number of problematic stations, i.e., stations that host zero bikes or that have no available spots at which a bike can be returned. The influence of the stations' capacities is quantified and the fleet size that minimizes the proportion of problematic stations is computed. Even in a homogeneous city, the system exhibits a poor performance: the minimal proportion of problematic stations is to the order of (but not lower than) the inverse of the capacity. We show that simple incentives, such as suggesting users to return to the least loaded station among two stations, improve the situation by an exponential factor. We also compute the rate at which bike has to be redistributed by trucks to insure a given quality of service. This rate is to the order of the inverse of the stations capacity. For all cases considered, the optimally reliable fleet size is a little more than half of the station capacity, the value of the little more depends on the system parameters.
Introduction
Bike-sharing systems (BSS) are becoming a public mode of transportation devoted to short trips. A few BSS have been launched since Copenhagen laucnhed theirs in 1995. BSS were widely deployed in the 2000s after Paris launched the large-scale program called Velib, in July 2007. Velib consists of 20000 available bikes and 1500 stations. Nowadays, there are more than 400 cities equipped with BSS around the world (see DeMaio [2009] for a history of BSS). This gives rise to a recent research activity.
The concept of BSS is simple: A user arrives at a station, takes a bike, uses it for a while and then returns it to any station. A lack of resources is one of the major issues: a user can arrive at a station that host no bike, or can want to return her bike at a station with no empty spot. The allocation of resources, bikes and empty places, has to be managed by the operator in order to offer a reliable alternative to other transportation modes.
and Lasgouttes [1996] . One of the main limitations of these papers is that they ignore that stations have finite capacities and therefore neglect the saturation effect.
Contributions -In this paper, we present a model of bike-sharing systems and we analyze its steady-state performance. The system is composed of a large number of stations and a fleet of bikes. Each station can host up to a finite number of bikes K, called its capacity. We measure the performance in terms of proportion of so-called problematic stations, i.e., stations with no bikes or no empty spot.
The framework is a simple scenario in which each station has the same parameters. In a sense, it is a best-case analysis of a system in which the flow of bikes between two stations is, on average, identical in both directions. We investigate the effects of imbalance due to the random choices of users and we characterize the influence of the station capacity on the performance. The main point is that the model is the simplest model to deal with. It enables us to compare incentives and redistribution mechanisms and obtain closed-form characteristics of their performance. Moreover, this model can be straightforwardly extended to model non-homogeneous cities in order to take into account the difference of attractivity among the stations. The paper by Fricker et al. [2012] provides analytical results when the stations can be grouped into clusters of stations that have the same characteristics. These results will be briefly presented and discussed in this paper. Incentive mechanisms and redistribution in an heterogeneous setting are not studied by Fricker et al. [2012] but will be included in their upcoming paper Fricker et al. [2013] .
Our first contribution is to study the simplest model without any incentives or redistribution mechanisms. Our main argument is to use mean-field methods, which enables us to obtain the asymptotic behavior for our model and its variants, as the system size becomes large. This methods works even if close form (product-form) expressions are not available for the original model. This method has some similarities with stochastic networks appearing in other applications as communication networks. This asymptotic dynamics leads to simple expressions that give qualitative and quantitative results. The proportion of problematic stations depends on the fleet size and decreases slowly with the capacity K. The optimally reliable fleet size is given in closed form. It is equal to K/2 + λ/µ bikes per station, where λ is the arrival rate of users at a station and 1/µ is the average trip time. This answers the fleet sizing problem. The term λ/µ quantifies the quite intuitive idea that the greater the demand is, the more bikes must be put in the system. For this fleet size, the proportion of problematic stations is 2/(K + 1).
To improve the situation, we investigate two different directions: incentives and redistribution. A practical implementation of incentives is not discussed. We rather assume that users have access to real-time information on the system and follow the rules. The improvement that is obtained in that case is quantified. We show that returning bikes to a non-saturated station does not change significantly the behavior of the stations and the performance with our metric. The situation improves dramatically when users return their bikes to the least loaded station among two, even if only a fraction of the users do this. We show that in this case, the proportion of problematic stations can be as low as √ K2 −K/2 . These results are confirmed by simulations in which users choose among two neighbooring stations. Again, the optimal fleet size is a little more than K/2.
We then study what we call the redistribution rate in Section 5. We define the redistribution rate as the ratio of the number of bikes that have to be moved manually by trucks over the number of bikes that are taken by users. It is proved that the redistribution rate which optimizes performance depends on the fleet size and the station capacity. The redistribution rate needed to suppress problematic stations is minimal when the fleet size is K/2 + λ/µ bikes per station and is equal to 1/(K − 1).
Finally, we discuss in Section 6 the limitations of the model. We describe briefly the differences that will occur when considering a time-or space-inhomogeneous model. We mainly refer to the paper by Fricker et al. [2012] , which main result is an extension of the expression of minimal proportion of problematic stations in a cluster at some fleet size, which generalizes s = K/2. We also show simulations results of a more realistic model that takes the geometry into account. In all cases, this model behaves closely to the original mean-field model.
Organization of the paper -Section 2 presents the model description and the mean field techniques. Section 3 deals with the basic model for the homogeneous system where stations have finite capacity. Incentive mechanisms where a fraction of users choose the least loaded of two stations to return their bike are studied in Section 4. The rate of redistribution by trucks which optimizes performance is computed in Section 5. Section 6 deals with simulation validations and the conclusion is presented in Section 7.
System Model and Mean-Field Analysis
This section presents the basic model. Mean-field techniques are used to investigate the performance of bike-sharing systems. These techniques reduce the study of the stochastic model to the study of the equilibrium point of a set of differential equations. The steps to obtain this result are detailed here. The other scenarios studied in this paper fit the same framework.
Main Notation List.
N Number of stations. s Average number of bikes per station (the total number of bikes is sN ). K Number of slots in a station, also called capacity of the station. λ Arrival rate of users at a station.
1/µ
Average trip time. Y N k (t) Proportion of stations that host k bikes at time t.
as N tends to infinity (described by an ODE). y Equilibrium point of the corresponding ODE. U N k (t) Proportion of stations that host k or more bikes at time t. u(t)
Limit of U N k (t) as N tends to infinity (described by an ODE). u Equilibrium point of the corresponding ODE.
2.2. Homogeneous Bike-Sharing Model. We consider a Markovian model of a bike-sharing system with N stations and a fleet of sN bikes (s bikes per station in average). A bike can be either hosted at a station or in transit between two stations. In this paper, we focus on the homogeneous bike-sharing model. It allows us to get a close-form expression for the optimal performance and also, in the next sections, to investigate incentives and redistribution by trucks in this framework, and to quantify their effects. Recall that, this study is extended to an inhomogeneous model by Fricker et al. [2012] . Each station can host up to K bikes. At each station, new users arrive at rate λ. If there is no bike at this station, the user leaves the system unhappy. If the station is not empty, the user takes a bike at this station and joins the pool of riding users. The trip time between the two stations is exponentially distributed with mean 1/µ.
After this time, the riding user wants to return her bike. She chooses a destination at random among all stations. If her destination has less than K bikes, the user returns her bike to this station and leaves the system. If the station has K bikes, no more bikes can be hosted at this station and this station is called saturated. In this case, the user rides to another station. This station is again chosen at random and the trip time is exponentially distributed with parameter µ. This process is repeated until she finds a non-saturated station.
This model does not incorporate any geographical information. Nevertheless, in a real-world system, users that cannot find a bike or cannot return their bike will try a neighboring station and not one at random. Unfortunately, these modifications lead to intractable models. As seen in the rest of the paper, our model can be thoroughly analyzed and leads to closed-form results. Moreover, simulations show in Section 6 that taking into account locality has little effect on the overall performance.
2.3. Mean-Field Limit and Steady-State Behavior. In this section, we prove that the analysis of the system boils down to the analysis of an ordinary differential equation (ODE) as N goes to infinity and that the equilibrium point can be addressed.
Let us denote by Y N k (t) the proportion of stations that host k bikes at time t. By the symmetry assumption, the process (
) is a Markov process. Let us compute its transitions. Suppose the process is at (y 0 . . . y K ). Bikes taken. The arrival rate of users in a station that has k ≥ 1 bikes is λN y k . This causes the kth coordinate, y k , to decrease by 1/N and y k−1 to increase by 1/N . Bikes returned. The number of bikes in transit is equal to the total fleet size sN minus the number of bikes hosted at the stations. Thus, it equals to N (s − N k=1 ky k ). As trip times are exponentially distributed with mean 1/µ and stations are chosen at random, a bike is returned at a station with k ≤ K − 1 bikes at rate y k µN (s − K k=1 ky k ). This causes the kth coordinate, y k , to decrease by 1/N and y k+1 to increase by 1/N .
The transitions can be summarized by
where the k-th unit vector of R K+1 is denoted by e k . This process belongs to the family of density dependent population processes, defined by Kurtz [1981] . This means that there exist a set of vector L ⊂ R K+1 and a set of functions {β } ∈L such that the transitions are of the form y → y + /N and occur at rate N β (y). This implies that, from y, the average change in a small interval dt is f (y)dt = ∈L β (y)dt. As f is Lipschitz-continuous, it is shown in Kurtz [1981] that as N goes to infinity, for each T > 0, the process (Y N (t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T ) converges in distribution to a deterministic function (y(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T ), which is the unique solution of the following differential system of equations:
where e k is the k-th unit vector of R K+1 . The first term corresponds to the rate of arrival of new users at a station, and the second term corresponds to the rate at which users return bikes, which is µ times the proportion of bikes in transit at time t.
The above differential equation rewrites where the y(t)L y(t) is the product of the row vector y(t), by the jump matrix L y(t) . L y is the infinitesimal generator of an M/M/1/K queue with arrival rate µ(s − k∈{1...K} ky k ) and service rate λ. This equation contains the mean field property of the model: this means that, when N tends to infinity, the empirical distribution y(t) of the stations evolves in time as the distribution of some non-homogeneous Markov process on {0, . . . , K}, whose jumps are given by L y(t) , updated by the current distribution y(t). These jumps rates are those of a M/M/1/K queue, where the arrival rate µ(s − K k=1 ky k (t)) is time dependent and the service rate is λ. This queue represents the instantaneous evolution of any station, because all the stations have the same evolution due to the symmetry. For large N , this "typical" station is representative of the whole network.
Throughout the paper, we investigate the steady-state behavior of the system. For all variants of the model studied in this paper, the dynamical system has a unique equilibrium point. Note that this fact alone does not imply that the sequence of invariant measures of Y N concentrates on this fixed point: it is necessary to show that the dynamical system does not have long-term oscillations and, in general, the proof of this is difficult. There are different techniques for obtaining this result. In Section 3, we show the absence of oscillations by using a generic Lyapunov function. Although numerical evidences show that this is also the case for the other models, the proof is out of the scope of the paper and the question is not addressed for models with incentives or redistribution.
2.4. Performance Metric and Proportion of Problematic Stations. In this paper, we mainly focus on a quality of service indicator, called the proportion of problematic stations. This proportion is the proportion of stations that either host zero bikes or are full. When the number of stations N goes to infinity, this proportion converges toȳ 0 +ȳ K , whereȳ is the unique fixed point of the differential equation.
This metric generalizes the loss probability, used for example in the context of vehicle rental networks by George and Xia [2010] , where the station capacities are infinite. Moreover, a user will be satisfied if she can take a bike at her departure and return it at her destination. In an homogeneous system like ours and if origin and destination are chosen uniformly at random, this occurs with probability 1 − (1 − y 0 )1(1 −ȳ K ) =ȳ 0 +ȳ K +ȳ 0ȳK ≈ȳ 0 +ȳ K . Hence, our metric is close to the limiting proportion of unsatisfied users, who cannnot enter the system or return their bike in the station of their choice. It measures the quality of service by Waserhole and Jost [2012] and Nair and Miller-Hooks [2011] . The average sojourn time in the system can also be deduced fromȳ 0 andȳ K .
The sumȳ 0 +ȳ K hides the relative value of each term, which can be useful to know. This has the advantage of providing a single indicator of the performance. Our goal in this paper is to obtain bounds on this performance criteria. The proportion of problematic station is not a cost function. In this paper, we do not question the cost or the practical methods for implementing our mechanisms and leave this question for future work. Hence, throughout the paper, the term optimal performance will be understood in term of minimizing this quality of service.
Basic Model and Optimal Fleet Size
This section is devoted to the basic model. As seen in Section 2.3, the behavior of the system can be approximated by the ODE (1) when the system gets large. This allows a complete study of the performance metric as a function of s. An optimal reliable fleet ratio is found and the best performance is derived. The influence of parameters λ/µ and K will be discussed.
3.1. Basic Model: Steady-State Analysis. An equilibrium pointȳ of the ODE (1) is the stationary measure of an M/M/1/K queue with arrival rate µ(s − K k=1 kȳ k ) and service rate λ. For ρ ≥ 0, let ν ρ be the invariant probability measure 1 of a M/M/1/K queue with arrival-to-service rate ratio ρ and define ρ(ȳ) = µ(s − k∈{0,...,K} kȳ k )/λ. The equilibrium points of (1) are thus the solutions of the fixed point equationȳ = ν ρ(ȳ) .
We now prove the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium point. For each ρ, there exists a unique stationary measure ν ρ . Hence, this equation is equivalent toȳ = ν ρ with ρ solution of
This equation can be easily explained. The proportion of bikes per station s is the sum of two terms: The mean number of users still riding, ρλ/µ, and the mean number of bikes per station, K k=1 kν ρ (k). The expression of first term can be computed using the arrival rate λ and the probability of finding an available bike at a station, 1 − ν ρ (0). Returning a bike at the k-th attempt takes an average time k/µ and occurs with probability
The right part of Equation (2) strictly increases in ρ. Therefore, for each s > 0, there is a unique ρ solution of equation (2) and thus a unique equilibrium point ν ρ is denoted byȳ(ρ) in the following.
A Lyapunov function can be exhibited. It is given by Fricker et al. [2012] in a more general setting. It shows that all trajectories of the ODE converge to the fixed point. As a consequence, the steady-state empirical distribution of the system concentrates on this unique fixed point. This means that the limiting stationary distribution of the number of bikes at a station is this fixed point, i.e., a geometric distribution on {0, . . . , K} where the parameter ρ is the solution of Equation (2).
Proportion of Problematic
Stations. The next theorem shows the effect of the number of bikes per station s on the performance of the system. Letȳ be the equilibrium point of the equation. The fixed point of the equation (1) can be rewritten as a polynomial equation in ρ of order K + 1. Hence, even if solving this equation is possible for very small values of K, finding a closed from expression for K ≥ 4 is unfeasible. Nevertheless, Equation (2) provides an efficient way to achieve a performance study of the system by considering the parametric curve
where, and in the following,ȳ(ρ) is equal to ν ρ . The use of this parametric curve allows us to study efficiently the performance of the system as a function of the number of bikes per station s. These results are summarized in the next theorem and on Figure 1 .
Theorem 1. For the symmetric model,
(i) the limiting proportion of problematic stations,ȳ 0 +ȳ K , is minimal when s = K/2 + λ/µ and the minimum is equal to 2/(K + 1). It goes to one when s goes to zero or infinity. (ii) As K grows, the performance around s = K/2 + λ/µ becomes flatter and insensitive to s and λ/µ.
. Functions ϕ and s are well defined on [0, ∞). The proportion of problematic stations as a function of s is given by ψ = ϕ • s −1 . First we prove that ψ has a minimum at s 0 = s(1) which is 2/(K + 1). For that, differentiating function ϕ with respect to ρ gives
Differentiating the numerator and studying the variation, it holds that the numerator strictly increases on [0, ∞) and ϕ (1) = 0. Thus ϕ strictly decreases on ]0, 1[, strictly increasing on ]1, +∞[ and has a minimum at 1 which is ϕ(1) = 2/(K + 1). This shows the optimal number of bikes per station corresponds to ρ = 1, and thus s(1) = K/2 + λ/µ is the optimal reliable proportion of bikes per station. This leads to a proportion of problematic stations of 2/(K + 1) and concludes the proof of (i).
To prove (ii), note that the second derivative of
2 . An asymptotic expansion of ϕ at ρ = 1 is given by
and therefore ϕ (1) = K(K − 1)/3(K + 1). Moreover, differentiating s gives that s (1) = λ/µ + K 2 /12 + K/6 which leads to
This means that ψ is never sharp for the range of values considered in this paper, i.e., K ≥ 10. Moreover, ψ (s 0 ) goes quickly to 0 as K grows.
This theorem indicates that, even for a symmetric system for which the number of bikes per station is chosen knowing all parameters of the users, the proportion of problematic stations decreases only at rate 1/K. This is problematic for practical situations where, for space constraints and construction costs, station capacities are often less than 20 or 30 bikes. A system with 30 bikes per station would lead to a proportion of problematic stations of 2/31 ≈ 6.5%. Although it might be acceptable if this bike-sharing system is used once in a while, a probability of 6.5% of problematic stations is too large for a reliable daily mode of transportation. The results of Theorem 1 are illustrated by Figure 1 , which plots the performance as the parametric curve given by Equation (3) for two values of the station capacity and three values of λ/µ.
When K is fixed to 30 and λ/µ = 1, the performance is almost equally good with 10 to 20 bikes per station (i.e., s ∈ [K/3; 2K/3]). However, as soon as the number of bikes per station is lower or higher, the performance decreases significantly. The problematic case is mainly due to empty stations at low s versus full ones at large s. When the size of the stations is K = 100, the performance is less sensitive to the number of bikes per station. As pointed out by Theorem 1, in this case, the proportion of problematic stations is 2/(K + 1) ≈ 2%: Multiplying the station capacity by 3 divides by 3 the minimum proportion of problematic stations. Having some stations designed to host up to 100 bikes is realistic for stations near a subway for example, but having all stations in a city with 100 slots is very costly in terms of space and installation cost.
When λ/µ = 10, the situation is similar to the case λ/µ = 1, with curves shifted to the right. The minimum number of problematic stations is the same, only the optimal reliable fleet size is changed. This fact can be deduced from (3) where the term λ/µ only affects s(ρ)=λ/µρ+ kρ kȳ 0 (ρ) and not the proportion of problematic stationsȳ 0 (ρ)+ȳ K (ρ).
These results suggest that without incentives for users to return their bike to a non-saturated station or without any load-balancing mechanisms, the implementation of a bike-sharing system will always observe a poor performance, even if the system is completely symmetric and there are no preferred areas. In a real system where some regions are more crowded than others (e.g., because of the trips from residential areas to work areas), the situation can only be worse. See Fricker et al. [2012] for a study. In the following, we will examine simple mechanisms that improve dramatically the situation.
3.3. If People Return the Bikes to a Non-saturated Station. Before studying incentive or regulation mechanisms, we study in this section a variant of the model where users know which stations are empty or full. They always arrive to non-empty stations and return their bikes only to non-saturated stations.
The dynamics of the system are slightly modified as follows. As before, there is a Poisson arrival process in the system at rate N λ, but each arriving user chooses at random a station among the non-empty stations. If there is no non-empty station, she leaves the system. If the user manages to find a bike, then after a time exponentially distributed with parameter µ, she arrives at a non-saturated station chosen at random (i.e., with less than K bikes), returns her bike at this station and leaves the system. Note that there is always a non-saturated station (this is the case if s < K).
The transitions of (Y N (t)) are now given by
The differential equation is replaced byẏ = f (y) where
The function f is discontinuous when y 0 goes to 1 or when y K goes to 1. Nevertheless, it can be shown with elementary arguments that if λ/µ < s < K +λ/µ then the differential equationẏ = f (y) has a unique solution. In the following, we assume that λ/µ < s < K + λ/µ. As for the previous model, equationẏ = f (y) can be rewritten asẏ = yL y . This time, L y is the infinitesimal generator of an M/M/1/K queue with arrival rate µ(s − k ky k )/(1 − y K ) and service rate λ/(1 − y 0 ). By the same method as in the previous section, it can be proved that the dynamical system has a unique fixed pointȳ, which is solution of the equation
Moreover, following the same lines as Tibi [Tibi, 2011, Proposition 4.3] , the steady-state, denoted by Y N (∞), converges as N gets large, to this fixed point. The limiting steady-state of the number of bikes at a station is, again, geometrically distributed, with parameter ρ given by the previous equation. The fact that the term ρλ/µ is replaced here by λ/µ can be simply explained. Each user is accepted in the system and returns the bike after one trip with mean time 1/µ. There are in average λ/µ users riding per station.
When studying the fixed point of the system, we find that the main difference with the original model studied in Section 3.2 is the expression of s. Therefore, the performance of the system is easily plotted by a parametric curve similar to (3). The proportion of problematic stations has a similar shape for this model and the one of the previous section. As before, the minimal proportion is 2/(K + 1) and is attained for s = K/2 + λ/µ. When s is not equal to K/2 + λ/µ, this proportion will be higher than in the classic model. This is illustrated on Figure 2 where the proportion of problematic stations for that model is compared with the model studied in Section 3.1. For small s, the less satisfactory behavior of the regulated system is due to the fact that every user can enter the system. This resembles the influence of a larger λ in Figure 1 . For large s, this poor behavior of the system is related to the improvement on the customer trip time. It has the same effect as the influence of 1/µ in the basic system. This shows that although forcing people to go to a non-saturated or non-empty station reduces the unhappy users because anyone can take or leave a bike at anytime, it makes the system more congested and degredate the situation for users that are not aware of such mechanisms.
Incentives and the Power of Two Choices
In this section, we consider that, when a user wants to return her bike somewhere, she indicates two stations and the bike-sharing system indicates to her which one of the two host the least number of bikes. We show when the two stations are chosen at random, the proportion of problematic stations diminishes as √ K2 −K/2 (instead of 1/K in the original model). The performance is thus improved dramatically, and even if only a small percentage of users obey this rule. This result is similar to the well-known power of two choices that has been proved to be a very efficient load balancing strategy, see Mitzenmacher [2001] . Simulations give numerical evidences that the results still hold even if the choices are limited to two neighboring stations. 4.1. The Two-Choice Model and Its Steady-State Analysis. We consider a symmetric model with N stations and s bikes per station. As before, users arrive at rate λ in each station and take a bike if the station is not empty. Otherwise, they leave the system. When a user chooses her destination, instead of choosing one station, she picks two stations at random and goes to the one that hosts the lower number of bikes.
Let u k (t) be the proportion of stations with k or more bikes at time t (k ∈ {0 . . . K}) i.e., u k (t) = y k (t) + · · · + y K (t). The state of the system can be described by the vector (u k (t)) k∈{0,...K} that is such that
There are two types of transitions for the Markov process. Suppose (u(t)) is at u = (u 0 , . . . , u K ). The first one is a transition from u to u − e k , when a user that takes a bike from a station with k bikes. This happens at rate N λ(u k −u k+1 1 {k<K} ). The second type is a transition from u to u + e k , when a user returns a bike. The number of bikes locked at stations is
As a user chooses the least loaded among two stations, a user returns a bike at a station with k −1 bikes at rate µN (u
As in Section 2, as N grows large, the behavior of the system can be approximated by the dynamics of the following ODE:
for k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and u 0 (t) = 1 and u (t) = 0 for > K.
The following theorem shows that these incentives dramatically improve the performance compared to the original model where users go to a station at random (Theorem 1). For a given capacity K, the optimal proportion of problematic stations goes from 2/K in the original model to
Theorem 2. Assume that all users obey to the two-choice rule. Then, the corresponding dynamical system, given by (4) has a unique fixed point. The proportion of problematic stations is lower than 4
Proof. First show that the ODE (4) has a unique fixed point. Let ρ := µ(s − k≥1ū k )/λ. The key point is to reduce the equation giving the fixed point to a first order recurrence equation. Indeed, a direct recurrence gives that a fixed point must satisfyū 0 = 1 and for all k ≤ K:
• This is true for k = 1 becauseū 1 (x) = x.
• Then, if it is true for some k ≥ 1, thenū k+1 is increasing on [x k , ρ] because x →ū k (x) is increasing and positive on [
This shows that there exists a unique
A fixed point of Equation (4) is a vector (ū 1 (x),ū 2 (x), . . .ū K (x)) such that u k (x) ≥ 0 andū K+1 (x) = 0. By the property stated above, for a fixed ρ, there is a unique fixed point, which is (ū 1 (x K+1 ), . . .ū K (x K+1 )). Moreover, s = k≥1ū k + ρλ/µ is increasing in ρ, which implies that there is a unique fixed point ρ when s is fixed.
Let k ≤ K and assume that ρ ≤ 1. Ifū 1 ≥ ρ, a direct recurrence shows that u k ≥ ρ 2 k −1 for k ≤ K + 1 , which contradicts the fact thatū K+1 = 0. Therefore,
. Asū K+1 = 0, using Equation (5),
, which is less than 0 for all K ≥ 1. This contradicts Equation (7) and shows that ε ≤ K2 −K . The proportion of empty stations isȳ 0 = 1 −ū 1 = δ + ε. The proportion of saturated stations isȳ K =ū K , which is such that ρ(ū 2 K − 1) +ū 1 = 0. Thus, u K = (ρ −ū 1 )/ρ. This shows that, for all ρ ∈ [1 − 2 −K/2 ; 1], the proportion of problematic stations is less than
This quantity is less than 4 √ K2 −K/2 for all K ≥ 1 and is asymptotically equivalent to √ K2 −K/2 . The fleet size s, equal to K k=1ū k + ρλ/µ, is an increasing function of ρ. Moreover,ū k ≤ū
This shows that if s
≥ K/2 + λ/µ, ρ ≥ 1 − 2 −K/2 . When ρ = 1, a direct induction on k shows thatū k ≥ max(0, 1 − 2 k ε). Let j be such that 1 − 2 j ε ≥ 0 > 1 − 2 j+1 ε. For such a j, j + 1 ≥ log 2 ε = K − log 2 K. Hence K k=1ū k ≥ j k=1 1 − 2 k ε ≥ j − (2 j+1 − 2)ε ≥ j − 2 j+1 ε ≥ K − log 2 K − 3.
This implies that, for all
Assume now that only a fraction of the users follow this rule and that the others go to a station at random. This could happen if the users are rewarded, when they obey the two-choice rule, like in the Velib+ system. To model this behavior, we assume that each user obeys to the two-choice rule with probability r and otherwise chooses only one station and returns the bike to it. The dynamics are similar to Equation (4) and an equilibrium pointū satisfies the following equations:ū 0 = 1 andū
In this case, the fixed point Equation (5) becomesū k+1 = ρ(r(1 −ū 2 k ) + (1 − r)(1 − u k )) +ū 1 . The proof of the uniqueness of the solution of Equation (5) can be easily adapted to show that Equation (8) also has a unique fixed point.
4.2. Impact on the Performance. Due to the uniqueness of the solutionū(ρ), the proof of Theorem 2, especially Equation (5), provides an efficient way to compute u as a function of ρ. This shows that, if ρ is fixed, the number of bikes in the system is s(ρ) = λρ/µ + K k=1ū k (ρ). The performance indicator can be plotted by using a parametric curve of parameter ρ. These results are reported in Figure 3 and indicate that the performance of the system is radically improved compared to the original case (Figure 1) , even if 20% of users obey the two-choice rule. On Figure 3(a) we report the proportion of problematic stations as a function of the proportion of bikes per station when everyone follows the two-choice rule. We observe that the optimal performance of the system is much better than in the original system (here K = 30 and λ/µ = 1). Although in the original system, the proportion of problematic stations is at best around 7%, here the proportion of problematic stations can be as low as 10 −6 (this is lower than the bound of Theorem 2, which is 2 √ 31 · 2 −30/2 ≈ 3 · 10 −4 ). Moreover, this curve is rather insensitive to variations in the number of bikes: the proportion of problematic stations is less than 10 −3 if s is between 10 and 27 bikes. An interesting phenomenon occurs when the average number of bikes per station s exceeds the capacity of the station. In this case, there is a larger proportion of problematic stations for the two-choice model than for the original situation. This is explained by the fact that when a user obeys the two-choice rules, it is easier for her to return a bike. Hence, when more users obey the two-choice rule, there are fewer bikes in transit and the stations are more occupied. This negative effect only occurs when s ≥ 30, which confirms Theorem 2: Performance is low for s less than a value K −log 2 K −3+λ/µ close to K.
On Figure 3(b) , the average number of bikes per station is fixed, s = 16 = K/2 + λ/µ, and the proportion r of users that obey the two-choice rule varies from 0 to 1. This shows that the proportion of problematic stations diminishes rapidly as soon as the number of users obeying the rule grows. Moreover, the decrease is approximately exponential: if 25% more users obey the rule, the proportion of problematic stations is roughly divided by 10.
Optimal Redistribution Rate
Balancing the number of bikes in various areas in a city is one of the major issues of bike-sharing systems. A widely adopted solution is the use of trucks to move bikes from saturated stations to empty ones. This redistribution mechanism can equalize the one-directional flows of travelers, for example from residential areas to work areas, but also the imbalances due to the choices of users. In this section the minimal redistribution rate needed to suppress any problematic station is investigated, and we conclude by showing that it decreases as the inverse of the station capacity. Our analysis assumes that bikes are moved one by one. This assumption will be relaxed in simulations in Section 6.4, thus showing that a larger truck size does not affect qualitatively the performance.
The Redistribution Model and Its Steady-State Analysis.
We consider a model of bike-sharing system with N stations equipped with a truck that visits the stations to adjust their load. The user behavior is the same as in Section 2. The arrival rate at any station is λ and a bike trip takes a time exponentially distributed of mean 1/µ. A truck knows the station occupancies at any time. It goes to the fullest station, takes a bike and returns it to the emptiest station. The trip time of the truck is neglected (the bikes are assumed to move instantaneously from full to empty stations). This description amounts to one truck that moves bikes at rate N γ. The resulting Markov model is the same if there is δ(N ) trucks moving bikes at rate N γ/δ(N ). In the rest of the section, we study the effect on the performance of the ratio γ/λ. This ratio is the average number of bikes per second that are moved manually by the operator divided by the number of bikes per second taken by regular users.
As in Section 4, let u k (t) be the proportion of stations that host k bikes or more at time t. In particular, u 0 (t) = 1 and u K+1 (t) = 0. There are three kinds of transition in the system: arrivals and departures of users and redistribution. The fluid model transitions corresponding to the user arrivals and departures are the same as in Equation (1) with a number of bikes in transit of N (s − K k=1 u k ). Moreover, the redistribution part only affects the most loaded and least loaded stations, i.e., stations that host k bikes with k such that no station host less than k bikes (u k−1 =1) or no station host more than k bikes (u k+1 = 0). This shows that the expected variation of u during a small time interval is equal to f (u) = (f 0 (u) . . . f K (u)), where for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K−1},
The function f (u) is not continuous in u. Hence, the ODEu = f (u) is not well defined and can have zero solutions. To overcome this discontinuity problem, it has been shown by Gaujal [2010, 2012] , that this ODE can be replaced by a differential inclusionu k ∈ F (u), where F (u) is the convex closure of the set of values f (u ) for u in a neighborhood of u. This differential inclusion is a good approximation of the stochastic system as N grows. In particular, as with classic ODE, if all the solutions of the differential inclusion converge to a fixed point, then their stationary measures concentrate on this point as N goes to infinity, see Gast and Gaujal [2012] . In our present case, the differential inclusion iṡ
where
To ease the presentation, the details of its construction are omitted. The construction is similar to Section 4.3 of Gast and Gaujal [2012] . This leads to the following result.
Theorem 3. Assume that a truck moves bikes from the most saturated station to the most empty one at rate γN . If x = min(s−λ/µ, K−s+λ/µ) and γ * = 2λ 2x −x 2x 2x−1 then the fixed point of the dynamical system (9) satisfies:
• If γ ≥ γ * , then there is no problematic station. • If γ < γ * , the proportion of problematic stations decreases with γ.
The quantity γ * is called the optimal redistribution rate. Setting γ = γ * is not necessarily optimal in terms of cost but it corresponds to a knee of the performance: When γ < γ * , the proportion of problematic station decreases almost linearly and is zero when γ > γ * .
Proof. Let us assume that s ≤ K/2 + λ/µ. The other case is symmetric and can be treated similarly. The proportion of problematic stations is non-increasing in the redistribution rate γ. We define the vector u = (u 0 , u 1 , . . . , u K ) by
Let us show that when γ = γ * , u is a fixed point of the differential inclusion (9), i.e., there exists g ∈ G(u) such that Equation (9) is equal to zero. Let g = (g 0 , g 1 , . . . , g K ) be a vector such that g 1 = γ, g 2s = λu 2s − γ, g 2s +1 = −λu 2s and g i = 0 otherwise. The vector g belongs to G(u), defined in Equation (9).
Moreover, by a direct computation,
Plugging it in Equation (9),
It proves that u is a fixed point of the differential inclusion (9). Using monotonicity arguments as in Theorem 2, one can show that this fixed point is unique. However, the proof is quite technical and hence, is omitted. As the proportion of problematic stations is zero for u, this concludes the proof of the theorem.
We now consider the case ρ < 1 (which corresponds to s < K/2 + λ/µ and γ < γ * ). Define z(ρ) :
It is straightforward to verify that for all ρ, x(ρ) is a fixed point of the differential equation (9). Moreover, the quantity k x k (ρ) is an increasing function of ρ. This shows that the differential equation has a unique fixed point (for γ < γ * ).
5.2. Impact on the Performance. Theorem 3 shows that the optimal redistribution rate decreases with the station capacity. The optimal redistribution rate is minimal for s = K/2 + λ/µ. In this case, moving bikes from full to empty stations at rate λ/(K − 1) suffices to avoid the existence of problematic stations. When x = min(s − λ/µ, K − s + λ/µ) is an integer, the optimal redistribution rate simplifies in γ * = λ/(2x − 1). These results are illustrated in Figure 4 . The station capacity is set to K = 10 and µ = +∞ (the trip time is negligible). The proportion of stations that host x bikes is plotted as a function of x. Two fleet sizes s = K/2 = 5 and s = 7 are compared, according to various values of γ: γ = 0, γ = γ * 5 = 1/9 (the optimal redistribution rate for s = K/2) and γ = γ * 7 = 1/5 (the optimal redistribution rate for s = 7).
In both cases, the occupancy distribution concentrates around s as γ increases. When s = 5, the occupancy distribution is uniform for γ = 0. As expected, there is no problematic station when γ ≥ γ * 5 = 1/9. When s = 7, the occupancy distribution is geometric for γ = 0 (see Section 3.1). For γ = 1/9 < γ * 7 , there is no empty station and the occupancy distribution is a trunked geometric. When γ = γ * 7 , the occupancy distribution is uniform on {5 . . . 9} and there is no problematic station. In this paper, we focus on bike-sharing systems in their simplest case: a homogeneous case. This means that the travel demand is constant with time and that this time is the same for any pair of origin and destination. The model presented in Section 3.1 captures the main features of these systems, i.e., loss of the arriving users, search when returning the bike. As we consider a homogeneous model, its performance is naturally described in terms of proportion of problematic stations in steady-state. A natural extension of these results is to consider space-inhomogeneity and timeinhomogeneity. Space-inhomogeneity often occurs in cities where some stations are higher or lower than others, thus creating a flow from one region of the city to another. Our basic model can be directly extended to this case, for example, by considering clusters of stations that have similar level of popularity. The steadystate behavior of such a model is exposed by Fricker et al. [2012] . This enables us to compute the optimal fleet size per cluster. Because of working hours or week-ends, bike sharing systems are often time-inhomogeneous. Modeling these phenomena can be done by considering tides of people that go from housing to working area in the morning and come back in the evening, as in Waserhole et al. [2013] . In this case, the proportion of problematic stations does not reflect the performance of the system and the definition of a performance metric is not clear and might depend on the situation. Characterizing and understanding such systems is an issue beyond the scope of this paper, and we plan to tackle it in future work.
6.2. Distribution of Trip Times and Arrival of Users. In order to have a tractable model, the distribution of inter-arrival times of users and of trip times are exponentially distributed. This leads to a Markovian model that has a compact representation. Investigating the influence of a more realistic distribution refinement, for example for searching times can be done by simulation. Our premiminary simulation results, that are not reported here, indicate that if the average trip time has an influence on the performance, the actual distribution has little impact. In a real system, the behavior is very close to the one of a system where trip times are follows an exponential distribution that has the same mean.
The features of the model can also be changed, while keeping the model tractable. For example, instead of loosing the user arriving at an empty station, a search for a bike until success can be added. The mean searching time 1/ν for finding or returning a bike can be different for the mean trip time 1/µ. Thus, when a user arrives in the system, both loss of users or avoiding empty stations can be seen as the two extreme cases as 1/ν gets to +∞ or to 0. The same can be done when returning a bike. These modifications do not change the nature of the model: the occupancy of station will still follow a geometric distribution. Only the influence of the fleet size s will change.
6.3. Influence of Geometry. The theoretical results strongly rely on the fact that the system has no geometry. Our model deals only with searching a station at random, skipping any notion of geometry. In real-world systems, finding or returning a bike can induce a local search for an available bike or an available locker. Analytically, such systems are out of reach. This section presents simulation results that show that the influence of geometry is limited, both for the basic model and the two-choice model. In the original model, two stations are always neighbors. In this section, the stations have a small number of neighbors. The two representations of geometry represented in Figure 5 are considered: a 2D grid and a single line. The 2D grid is a schematic representation of a homogeneous city center like that of Manhattan. This situation aims at being a good representation of many bike-sharing systems: the stations are placed quite evenly on a plane and each station has a few neighbors (here, four) spread around it. The 1D line is a more extreme case that corresponds to a city spread along a single road. Because each station has only two neighbors, imbalances due to random choices are expected to have more impact on the performance.
The model. We simulate two discrete time models. At each time step, a user arrives at one station at random. If the station is not empty, she takes a bike. In the one choice case, Figure 5 (a) and Figure 5 (c), she chooses a destination at random. If this station is full, she performs a random walk on the neighbors of the destination until she finds a non-saturated station. In the two-choice case, the user chooses the least loaded station among two neighbors. Again, the user performs a local search if the station is full. To simplify, we neglect the trip time of users. This corresponds to setting µ = +∞ in the original model.
The proportion of problematic stations for all cases is reported in Figure 6 . In both cases, the models were simulated with N = 25, N = 100 and N = 400 stations. Each point represents the average over 20 independent simulations. The error bars indicate confidence intervals but are most of the time too small to be seen. We compare these values with the theoretical bounds when N gets large 2/(K + 1) for the non-geometric one-choice model and √ K2 −K/2 for the two-choice model. In all cases, the performance of the geometric models exhibits the same trend as the theoretical bounds. In particular, the performance obtained for the 2D grid are mostly independent of N and are very close to the theoretical bounds. This shows that the bound obtained in Theorems 1 and 2 are representative of more realistic systems, even if they are obtained on models that do not take into account the geometry. The theoretical models studied in Sections 2 to 5 assume that any pair of stations are neighbors. Hence, intuitively, the larger the number of neighbors is, the closer the performance to the theoretical bound will be. Our numerical results show that, in the present situation, even a 2D grid exhibits a performance close to the theory. As the positioning of stations is similar to a 2D grid in many bike-sharing systems, it implies that the basic model reflects the behavior of realistic scenarios.
6.4. Influence of Truck Capacity. In the redistribution model presented in Section 5, we assume that bikes are moved individually by a truck. This leads to a simple formula for the optimal redistribution rate. In practice, however, bikes are moved by trucks that can contain a few tens of bikes. This section reports simulation results of the model described in Section 6.3 where a truck of capacity C is added. To obtain a fair comparison, the rate at which the truck visits the stations is set inversely proportional to the truck capacity. Hence, with this scaling, having a larger truck capacity leads to a poorer performance: the balance achieved when bikes are moved one by one at rate 10 is better than when bikes are moved ten by ten at rate 1.
The simulated model is composed of N stations that are placed in a 2D grid, as in Figure 5(a) . Users move as in the one-choice model of Section 6.3: At each time step, a user arrives at one station chosen at random, takes a bike if this station is not empty, and performs a local search if the targeted destination is full. At each time step, with probability γ/C, a truck transports bikes from the station that has the largest number of bikes and places them in the station that has the smallest number of bikes. The truck tries to equalize the number of bikes between the two stations but cannot move more than C bikes at a time. The case C = 1 corresponds to the model described before. The maximum number of bikes per time slot that can be moved by truck does not depend on C and is equal to C(γ/C) = γ. The proportion of problematic stations are reported in Figure 7 for two stations capacity: K = 15 and K = 30. Recall s = K/2. For K = 15, simulation results for C = 1, C = 3 and C = 5 are compared with the theoretical values obtained from the fixed point analysis. For K = 30, simulation results for C = 1, C = 5 and C = 10 are compared with the theoretical values. The vertical lines represent the optimal redistribution rate γ * , obtained from Theorem 3. We observe that the theoretical model (with a truck capacity of one) predicts qualitatively the performance of the simulated models. This prediction is an optimistic estimation of the simulated values. Moreover, as expected, the performance decreases with the truck capacity.
To conclude, in a symmetric system, the optimal redistribution rate depends on the capacity of the station and leads to a great improvement of the system performance. It can be shown that combining this redistribution mechanism with the two-choice incentives introduced in the previous section leads to an optimal redistribution rate close to O( √ K2 −K/2 ).
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we investigate the influence of the station capacities on the performance of homogeneous bike-sharing systems. Using a stochastic model and a fluid approximation, we provide analytical expressions for the performance. They are summarized in Table 1 . The optimal fleet size is approximately K/2 for all models. Without using incentives, the capacity has only a linear effect on the performance or on the optimal redistribution rate. For this purpose, an incentive to return bikes to the least loaded station among two improves dramatically the performance, even if a small proportion of users accept to do this. Moreover, even if this model does not take into account any geographic aspect of the system, simulations show that these results also hold when considering simple geometric models with local interactions.
Minimal proportion of problematic stations
Optimal fleet size s Our results prove that the mismatch of performance due to random choices should not be neglected when studying the performance of a bike-sharing system. Even in a completely balanced system, they dramatically affect the performance. A natural extension of this work is to consider stations with different parameters. The steady-state performance of such a system is given by Fricker et al. [2012] . It proves that, without repositioning via incentives or trucks, the performance is very poor. One interesting question is whether the steady-state performance can be used as a metric in a system with varying operation conditions, such as peak-hours and non-peak hours. Our work can serve as a building block for studying the effect of incentives and redistribution mechanisms. Studying practical implementations of these mechanisms in real-world systems is postponed for future work. Morevoer, the transient behavior of such mechanisms in a city where the attractiveness of stations varies over time could be studied.
